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1. Introduction    
Probabilistic Safety Assessment is a standardized tool for assessing and improving nuclear 
power plant safety (ASME RA-S-2002, 2002; S-294, 2005; RA-S-2008, 2008). It is also used for 
assessment and improvement of the reliability of various systems in other industries, e.g. air 
and space industry and chemical industry. For the case of new nuclear power plants it may 
be required as a part of the safety analysis report, which is the main document needed for 
licensing of the plant operation. 
 
2. History and State of the Art 
Probabilistic risk analysis or probabilistic safety assessment has developed significantly in 
the last five decades from its first steps (Keller & Modarres, 2005), when the report known as 
WASH-740 was written in the year 1957 (WASH-740, 1957). 
The term probabilistic risk analysis was more used in United States of America, while term 
probabilistic safety assessment was more used in Europe. Sometimes, the term probabilistic 
safety assessment was even used to specify only the systems reliability and accident 
sequences up to the core damage frequency, which may only refer to level 1, while the term 
probabilistic risk analysis was used to specify also the containment systems, which may 
refer to level 2, and consequence analysis, which may refer to level 3, in addition 
(NUREG/CR-2300, NUREG/CR-2815, 1985). 
The WASH-740 study focused on the undesired consequences of large loss of coolant 
accident as the leading source of the worst radiation release into the environment. 
A decade later, the risk curves were developed, which showed the small risk of nuclear 
power plants compared to other risks including risk caused by human activities and risk 
caused by nature itself (Farmer, 1967). 
A report WASH-1400 was written in the year 1975 and a large debate followed about the 
applicability of the methods and results (WASH-1400, 1975). When the accident at Three 
Mile Island happened, it was soon concluded, that suggestions of WASH-1400 were very 
useful and wider applicability of the methods and results followed in the United States of 
America in order to prevent similar and other accidents (NUREG/CR-2300, 1982; 
NUREG/CR-2728, 1983; NUREG/CR-2815, 1985). Similarly, more efforts were put to 
8
www.intechopen.com
Nuclear Power124
 
probabilistic safety assessment in other countries such as Germany (GRS, 1980) and France 
(Brisbois et al., 1990). 
After the Chernobyl accident in Ukraine, the probabilistic safety assessment has become an 
obligation for all plants worldwide e.g. the Generic Letter 88-20 in United States of America 
(GL 88-20, 1988), e.g. the decree for probabilistic safety assessment in Slovenia. 
A number of documents were prepared nationally (NUREG/CR-1150, 1989; NUREG/CR-
4550, 1990; HSE, 1992) and internationally (50-P-4, 1992; 50-P-8, 1995; 50-P-12, 1996) 
including guidelines and examples of applications (NUREG/CR-6141, 1995). Wider 
performance of probabilistic safety assessment followed in the industry and in the 
regulatory bodies (YVL-2.8, 2003; S-294, 2005). The activities include the developed 
standards for probabilistic safety assessment (ASME RA-S-2002, 2002; S-294, 2005; IEC 
61025, 2006; RA-S-2008, 2008).  Standard ASME RA-S-2002 evolved from year 2002 to 2005 
and 2008. 
The further step of assessing risks was achieved by development of risk-informed decision-
making, which has brought forward the risk analyses into the acceptance of decisions 
considering the risk analyses results. The background for risk-informed decision-making in 
United States of America is policy document from 1995 (60 FR 42622, 1995). The application 
procedures are described in regulatory guides, which evolved in years of their use (RG 
1.174, 2002; RG 1.177, 1998; RG 1.200, 2007; RG 1.201, 2006). The practical applications are 
conducted (Vaurio, 1995; Harunuzzaman & Aldemir,  1996; Čepin & Mavko, 1997; Martorell 
et al., 2006). 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration began to use probabilistic risk assessment 
methods in 1967, following the disastrous fire on Apollo 1 (PRA NASA Guide, 2002). 
Engineers completed a fault tree analysis for the entire Apollo system. They relied on highly 
conservative measures and data. They estimated so high failure probabilities for Apollo 
missions that the results led to a distrust of probabilistic risk assessment results. However, 
following the Challenger explosion in 1986, probabilistic risk assessment at national 
aeronautics and space administration was revived, and the Columbia break-up in 2003 
reiterated the need for risk analyses.  
National aeronautics and space administration used risk assessment and a combination of 
fault and event trees methods to model possible accident scenarios for the shuttle and 
International Space Station (ISS) programs (Maggio, 1996). 
 
2.1 Lessons from the past 
Unfortunately, the probabilistic safety assessment has always achieved more attention after 
some major accident. That was the case with Three Mile Island and Chernobyl in the nuclear 
industry and in the case of Apollo and Challenger in the case of space industry.  
Nowadays, the probabilistic safety assessment is performed and it is used for decision-
making in the most of the nuclear power plants and in the space programs (Apostolakis, 
2004). The emphasis of probabilistic safety assessment to nuclear power plants as a 
standardised way to assess and improve safety is placed forward in this book. 
 
3. Methods of Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
The primary methods, which are integrated into probabilistic safety assessment, include 
fault tree analysis and event tree analysis (Kumamoto & Henley, 1996; NUREG/CR-2300, 
 
1982; NUREG/CR-2815, 1985). The fault tree analysis is oriented to analyses of systems 
(NUREG-0492, 1981; Vesely et al., 2002; IEC 61025, 2006).  The event tree analysis is oriented 
to connections between the systems (Papazoglou, 1998; Swaminathan & Smidts, 1999). 
 
3.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
The fault tree is a tool to identify and assess all combinations of undesired events in the 
context of system operation and its environment that can lead to the undesired state of a 
system (NUREG-0492, 1981; Vesely et al., 2002; Čepin & Mavko, 2002). It is not a process to 
identify all undesired events, but it is oriented only to those which can lead to the undesired 
state of the system. 
Undesired state of the system is represented by a top event. The top event is an undesired 
event, which represents undesired state of the system of interest. The top event of the fault 
tree example on Fig. 1 is defined as “SS1 fails to deliver water from point A to point B” and 
it means that the safety system 1 fails to accomplish its mission.  
The bottom part of Fig. 1 represents the example system, for which the fault tree is 
developed. SS1 system has to deliver specified amount of water from point A to B. Example 
system includes two redundant lines of the system. One line of the system is of enough 
capacity to accomplish success criteria of the system: line 1 or line 2 can realise the system 
mission.  
Box B3 represents the pump B3, which has to run and box B4 represents the valve B4, which 
has to be open in order that the water is delivered to point B. Box B1 represents operator 
action, which insures water, if automatic pump operation and valve opening on line 1 are 
not successful. Box B5 represents the pump B5, which has to run and box B6 represents the 
valve B6, which has to be open in order that the water is delivered to point B. Box B2 
represents operator action, which insures water, if automatic pump operation and valve 
opening on line 2 are not successful. The initial states of components include stopped 
pumps and closed valves. 
The fault tree is developed in sense of faults. So, the top event usually means that the system 
under investigation fails or at least one of its functions fails. If the system success criteria 
require at least one out of two system portions to operate, the failure to meet this success 
criteria is represented in the top event as a failure of two out of two system portions. The 
duality between success criteria and failure occurrences has to be considered properly. 
Logical gates connect the basic events to the top event. Logical gates on Fig. 1 are 
represented with abbreviations Gi (e.g. G1, G2, G3 and G4). They represent the logic 
connections between the components of the system. They include the logic connection 
between operation of the system and operator actions. They are identified by the name code 
and they include description. They are defined from point of view of possible faults, which 
can cause the top event. Each logical gate can be either the AND gate, where both input 
event occurrences are required for the output event, or the OR gate, where at least one of 
input event occurrences is required for the output event , or the K/N gate, where at least K 
input event occurrences are required for the output event. In theory, other logical gates can 
be used, such as NOR or NAND, but they are usually excluded from practical use. Negated 
gates are not desired because of assumptions used at evaluation of the fault trees.  
Gate G1 represents the failure of line 1 to deliver water to point B.  
Gate G2 represents the failure of line 2 to deliver water to point B.  
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probabilistic safety assessment in other countries such as Germany (GRS, 1980) and France 
(Brisbois et al., 1990). 
After the Chernobyl accident in Ukraine, the probabilistic safety assessment has become an 
obligation for all plants worldwide e.g. the Generic Letter 88-20 in United States of America 
(GL 88-20, 1988), e.g. the decree for probabilistic safety assessment in Slovenia. 
A number of documents were prepared nationally (NUREG/CR-1150, 1989; NUREG/CR-
4550, 1990; HSE, 1992) and internationally (50-P-4, 1992; 50-P-8, 1995; 50-P-12, 1996) 
including guidelines and examples of applications (NUREG/CR-6141, 1995). Wider 
performance of probabilistic safety assessment followed in the industry and in the 
regulatory bodies (YVL-2.8, 2003; S-294, 2005). The activities include the developed 
standards for probabilistic safety assessment (ASME RA-S-2002, 2002; S-294, 2005; IEC 
61025, 2006; RA-S-2008, 2008).  Standard ASME RA-S-2002 evolved from year 2002 to 2005 
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The further step of assessing risks was achieved by development of risk-informed decision-
making, which has brought forward the risk analyses into the acceptance of decisions 
considering the risk analyses results. The background for risk-informed decision-making in 
United States of America is policy document from 1995 (60 FR 42622, 1995). The application 
procedures are described in regulatory guides, which evolved in years of their use (RG 
1.174, 2002; RG 1.177, 1998; RG 1.200, 2007; RG 1.201, 2006). The practical applications are 
conducted (Vaurio, 1995; Harunuzzaman & Aldemir,  1996; Čepin & Mavko, 1997; Martorell 
et al., 2006). 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration began to use probabilistic risk assessment 
methods in 1967, following the disastrous fire on Apollo 1 (PRA NASA Guide, 2002). 
Engineers completed a fault tree analysis for the entire Apollo system. They relied on highly 
conservative measures and data. They estimated so high failure probabilities for Apollo 
missions that the results led to a distrust of probabilistic risk assessment results. However, 
following the Challenger explosion in 1986, probabilistic risk assessment at national 
aeronautics and space administration was revived, and the Columbia break-up in 2003 
reiterated the need for risk analyses.  
National aeronautics and space administration used risk assessment and a combination of 
fault and event trees methods to model possible accident scenarios for the shuttle and 
International Space Station (ISS) programs (Maggio, 1996). 
 
2.1 Lessons from the past 
Unfortunately, the probabilistic safety assessment has always achieved more attention after 
some major accident. That was the case with Three Mile Island and Chernobyl in the nuclear 
industry and in the case of Apollo and Challenger in the case of space industry.  
Nowadays, the probabilistic safety assessment is performed and it is used for decision-
making in the most of the nuclear power plants and in the space programs (Apostolakis, 
2004). The emphasis of probabilistic safety assessment to nuclear power plants as a 
standardised way to assess and improve safety is placed forward in this book. 
 
3. Methods of Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
The primary methods, which are integrated into probabilistic safety assessment, include 
fault tree analysis and event tree analysis (Kumamoto & Henley, 1996; NUREG/CR-2300, 
 
1982; NUREG/CR-2815, 1985). The fault tree analysis is oriented to analyses of systems 
(NUREG-0492, 1981; Vesely et al., 2002; IEC 61025, 2006).  The event tree analysis is oriented 
to connections between the systems (Papazoglou, 1998; Swaminathan & Smidts, 1999). 
 
3.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
The fault tree is a tool to identify and assess all combinations of undesired events in the 
context of system operation and its environment that can lead to the undesired state of a 
system (NUREG-0492, 1981; Vesely et al., 2002; Čepin & Mavko, 2002). It is not a process to 
identify all undesired events, but it is oriented only to those which can lead to the undesired 
state of the system. 
Undesired state of the system is represented by a top event. The top event is an undesired 
event, which represents undesired state of the system of interest. The top event of the fault 
tree example on Fig. 1 is defined as “SS1 fails to deliver water from point A to point B” and 
it means that the safety system 1 fails to accomplish its mission.  
The bottom part of Fig. 1 represents the example system, for which the fault tree is 
developed. SS1 system has to deliver specified amount of water from point A to B. Example 
system includes two redundant lines of the system. One line of the system is of enough 
capacity to accomplish success criteria of the system: line 1 or line 2 can realise the system 
mission.  
Box B3 represents the pump B3, which has to run and box B4 represents the valve B4, which 
has to be open in order that the water is delivered to point B. Box B1 represents operator 
action, which insures water, if automatic pump operation and valve opening on line 1 are 
not successful. Box B5 represents the pump B5, which has to run and box B6 represents the 
valve B6, which has to be open in order that the water is delivered to point B. Box B2 
represents operator action, which insures water, if automatic pump operation and valve 
opening on line 2 are not successful. The initial states of components include stopped 
pumps and closed valves. 
The fault tree is developed in sense of faults. So, the top event usually means that the system 
under investigation fails or at least one of its functions fails. If the system success criteria 
require at least one out of two system portions to operate, the failure to meet this success 
criteria is represented in the top event as a failure of two out of two system portions. The 
duality between success criteria and failure occurrences has to be considered properly. 
Logical gates connect the basic events to the top event. Logical gates on Fig. 1 are 
represented with abbreviations Gi (e.g. G1, G2, G3 and G4). They represent the logic 
connections between the components of the system. They include the logic connection 
between operation of the system and operator actions. They are identified by the name code 
and they include description. They are defined from point of view of possible faults, which 
can cause the top event. Each logical gate can be either the AND gate, where both input 
event occurrences are required for the output event, or the OR gate, where at least one of 
input event occurrences is required for the output event , or the K/N gate, where at least K 
input event occurrences are required for the output event. In theory, other logical gates can 
be used, such as NOR or NAND, but they are usually excluded from practical use. Negated 
gates are not desired because of assumptions used at evaluation of the fault trees.  
Gate G1 represents the failure of line 1 to deliver water to point B.  
Gate G2 represents the failure of line 2 to deliver water to point B.  
www.intechopen.com
Nuclear Power126
 
The AND gate of the top event shows that both lines has to fail (line 1 has to fail and line 2 
has to fail) in order that the system fails. 
Gate G3 represents failures of automatic actions of pump B3 and valve B4 in order to 
provide water to point B. 
Gate G4 represents failures of automatic actions of pump B5 and valve B6 in order to 
provide water to point B. 
 
G1 G2
G4 B2G3 B1
B3 B4 B5 B6
1E-1
1E-3 1E-3
2E-42E-4 3E-4
SS1 SS1 – safety system 1
G1, G2, G3, G4 – logical gates
B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6 – basic events
Logical equations suit their graphical
representation:
SS1=G1 * G2
G1=G3 * B1
G3=B3 + B4
G2=G4 * B2
G4=B5 + B6
* represents logical AND
+ represents logical OR
Top event describes
undesired system
state. E.g. safety
system 1 fails
Logical gates
represent connections
between components
Basic events mostly
represent the
components failure
modes
B2
B1
B3 B4
B5 B6
SS1 safety system 1
Line 1 of
the system
Line 2 of
the system
A B
 Fig. 1. Fault tree example 
 
Basic events are the ultimate parts of the fault tree, which represent undesired events, such 
as component failure modes, missed actuation signals, human errors (NUREG/CR-1278, 
1983), contributions of testing and maintenance activities and common cause contributions. 
Basic events on Fig. 1 are represented with abbreviations Bi (e.g. B1, B2, B3, B4, B5 and B6). 
They are identified by name code and they include description of the failure mode and 
identification of the component under investigation.  
Basic event B3 represents failure of pump B3 to start and run for specified period of time at 
specified capacity. Basic event B4 represents failure of valve B4 to open and stay open for 
the specified period of time. Basic event B1 represents failure of operator to establish water 
flow if automatic action was not successful. Similarly is with basic events B2, B5 and B6 on 
the other line. 
The fault tree is mathematically represented by a set of Boolean equations or by the fault 
tree figure itself. The Boolean equations and the fault tree for the example system are 
presented on Fig. 1. 
 
Numbers below the basic events represent their failure probabilities, which are either 
obtained from data bases or they are calculated with the probabilistic models based on data 
about the previous experience with those or similar components and their failure modes 
that are defined in the respective basic events. 
The qualitative fault tree analysis is the process of Boolean reduction of a set of Boolean 
equations.  The rules of Boolean algebra are presented on Table 1. The sign for product suits 
the AND logic and the sign for sum suits the OR logic.  
 
Boolean Law Expressions 
Commutative Law X+Y=Y+X XY=YX  
Associate Law (X+Y)+Z=X+(Y+Z) (XY)Z=X(YZ)  
Distributive Law X(Y+Z)=XY+XZ (X+Y)Z=XZ+YZ  
Identity Law XX=X X+X=X  
Redundancy Law X(X+Y)=X X+XY=X (X')'=X 
Complementary Law X+X'=1 XX'=0   
De Morgan's Theorem (XY)'=X'+Y' (X+Y)'=X'Y'  
Table 1. Rules of Boolean algebra 
 
For the fault tree example from Fig. 1 it is needed that all five logical equations are inserted 
one to another in order to have one logical equation starting from top event and consisting 
of basic events as its parameters. 
 
SS1 = ((B3+B4)*B1) * ((B5+B6)*B2) (1) 
 
Qualitative fault tree analysis identifies the minimal cut sets, which are the combinations of 
the smallest number of component faults that may cause the system fault. In other words, 
the minimal cut sets are combinations of the smallest number of basic events, which, if occur 
simultaneously, may lead to the top event.  
The logical equation representing the fault tree has to be written as the sum of products. The 
rules of the Boolean algebra are used for rewriting of the equation. For example fault tree 
from Fig. 1 , eq. 2 represents such required reformulation of eq. 1. 
 
SS1 = B3*B1* B5*B2+B4*B1*B5*B2+ B3*B1*B6*B2+ B4*B1* B6*B2 (2) 
 
The general expression for the minimal cut sets is the following. 
 



n
i
iMCSSS
1
  (3) 
SS - top event, 
MCSi - minimal cut set i, 
n - number of minimal cut sets. 
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


m
j
BjMCSi
1
 (4) 
 
m - number of basic events in minimal cut set i. 
For the example fault tree from Fig. 1, the qualitative results indicate four minimal cut sets. 
Each includes four basic events. This means that the safety system 1 fails if basic events B3 
and B1 and B5 andB2 occur or if basic events B4 and B1 and B5 and B2 occur or if basic 
events B3 and B1 and B6 and B2 occur or if basic events B4 and B1 and B6 and B2 occur. 
Minimal cut set can be a single minimal cut set, if one basic event occurrence causes the top 
event, or in other words: one component failure causes the system failure. Minimal cut set 
can be a double minimal cut set,  if two basic events occurrences cause the top event, or in 
other words: two component failures cause the system to fail. Minimal cut set can be a triple 
minimal cut set, if three basic events occurrences cause the top event. The example fault tree 
evaluation shows that four quadruple minimal cut sets are qualitative result of fault tree 
evaluation of the example fault tree. 
Quantitative fault tree analysis includes the following results. 
- Calculation of the system unavailability, which is one of the main risk measures at the 
system and component level, which is based on probability of failure of safety system 
components and which is obtained through calculation of the top event probability. 
- Calculation of Risk Increase Factor (RIF, sometimes interpreted also as Risk Achievement 
Worth, RAW), which identifies components, which in case of their failure (failure 
probability assumed as 1), impact significantly the system (or plant) risk increase. For those 
components it is worth to maintain them well in order that the reliability of the system is not 
reduced (i.e. in order that the risk is not increased). 
- Calculation of Risk Decrease Factor (RDF, sometimes interpreted also as Risk Reduction 
Worth, RRW), which identifies components, which in case of their complete success (failure 
probability is assumed as 0) impact significantly the system (or plant) risk decrease. For 
those components it is worth to improve their reliability in order that the reliability of the 
system is increased (i.e. in order that the risk is decreased).  
The fault tree top event probability is calculated according to eq. 5. 
 


n
i
MCSin
kji
MCSkMCSjMCSi
ji
MCSjMCSi
n
i
MCSiS
QQ
QQQ
1
1
1
)1(...







  
(5) 
 
QSS - top event probability 
Or, it can be approximated with the following equation - for Qmcsi less than 0.1, the 
approximate results stay in 10% of accuracy in the conservative side (Čepin, 2005). If the 
negated events are considered in the fault tree analysis, the care should be taken about the 
use of approximations. 
 



n
i
MCSiSS QQ
1
 (6) 
 
For the assumption that the basic events are mutually exclusive, the following can be used. 
 



m
j
BjMCSi QQ
1
 (7) 
 
QBj - probability of occurrence of basic event Bj 
 
),( ,...,,,,, pjrjtjijjojjBjBj TTTTqQQ   (8) 
 
QBj - probability of occurrence of basic event Bj 
j  - operating failure rate of the equipment modeled in the basic event Bj, 
oj  - standby failure rate of the equipment modeled in the basic event Bj, 
qj - probability of failure per demand of equipment modeled in basic event Bj, 
Tm – mission time, 
Tij  - test interval of standby equipment modeled in basic event Bj, 
Ttj  - test duration time of standby equipment modeled in basic event Bj, 
Trj  - repair time (i.e. mean time to repair or mean time to restore) of standby equipment 
modeled in basic event Bj, 
Tpj  - test placement time of standby equipment modeled in basic event Bj (it specifies the 
timing of test). 
Probability of occurrence of basic event is calculated according to selected equation. Simple 
example of probabilistic model for a component, which should actuate on a demand is 
shown on the following equation. 
 
q=ns/n (9) 
 
q - probability of failure per demand, 
ns – number of failed operations, 
n – number of all operations. 
Other probabilistic models are in more details presented in references (NUREG-0492, 1981; 
Vesely et al., 2002).  
Risk Increase Factor is calculated according to the following equation (NUREG/CR-3385, 
1983; NEI 00-04, 2005). 
 
)(
)1(
BjSS
BjSS
QQ
QQRIFj   (10) 
 
RIFj … Risk Increase Factor for equipment modeled in basic event Bj, 
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m - number of basic events in minimal cut set i. 
For the example fault tree from Fig. 1, the qualitative results indicate four minimal cut sets. 
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QSS - top event probability 
Or, it can be approximated with the following equation - for Qmcsi less than 0.1, the 
approximate results stay in 10% of accuracy in the conservative side (Čepin, 2005). If the 
negated events are considered in the fault tree analysis, the care should be taken about the 
use of approximations. 
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For the assumption that the basic events are mutually exclusive, the following can be used. 
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QBj - probability of occurrence of basic event Bj 
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QBj - probability of occurrence of basic event Bj 
j  - operating failure rate of the equipment modeled in the basic event Bj, 
oj  - standby failure rate of the equipment modeled in the basic event Bj, 
qj - probability of failure per demand of equipment modeled in basic event Bj, 
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Tij  - test interval of standby equipment modeled in basic event Bj, 
Ttj  - test duration time of standby equipment modeled in basic event Bj, 
Trj  - repair time (i.e. mean time to repair or mean time to restore) of standby equipment 
modeled in basic event Bj, 
Tpj  - test placement time of standby equipment modeled in basic event Bj (it specifies the 
timing of test). 
Probability of occurrence of basic event is calculated according to selected equation. Simple 
example of probabilistic model for a component, which should actuate on a demand is 
shown on the following equation. 
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Other probabilistic models are in more details presented in references (NUREG-0492, 1981; 
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QSS(QBj=0) - top event probability considering QBj=0 (component Bj cannot fail). 
 
3.2 Event Tree Analysis 
The event tree analysis is a method used to represent potential accident sequences or 
scenarios associated with a particular undesired initiating event (Papazoglou, 1998; 
Swaminathan & Smidts, 1999; PRA NASA Guide, 2002).  
The initiating event is an event, which may lead to the accident consequences. The event tree 
model describes the logical interrelationships between potential safety system function 
successes and failures in a timely manner after the initiating event.  
Safety system functions are the means to prevent the accident or to mitigate its 
consequences. Human actions can also be considered similarly as the safety system 
functions. Each separate safety system function can be further analysed with the fault tree 
analysis.  
The end states of the accident scenarios are plant damage states. 
Fig. 2 shows a generalised example of the event tree. Initiating event can be event such loss 
of offsite power or important pipe break of specified size for example if nuclear power plant 
is the object of investigation.  
 
Id.
No.
Frequency Plant Damage
State
1 OK
 2 4.39E-8/ry CD1
4E-6 /ry 3 4.04E-8/ry CD2
4 CD3


SS1 fails
SS2 fails
SS3 fails
Safety System 2 Safety System 3
4E-10/ry
(3.92E-6/ry)
Safety System 1Initiating
Event
SS3 succeeds
SS2 succeeds
SS1 succeeds
 Fig. 2. Event tree – generalised example 
 
After the initiating event, the safety system 1 should operate in sense that undesired plant 
damage states are reached. If the system succeeds the scenario goes upwards the event tree, 
if it fails, downwards at the node of safety system 1.  
For all safety systems consecutively one after another as their operation follows the time and 
listing sequence, their success is shown in the event tree upwards from the previous node 
and failure is shown downwards from the node. The branches of the event tree which refer 
to safety system failure can be linked to a fault tree model of that safety system. 
At the end, the plant damage states are identified. Code OK on the Fig. 2 means that the 
state of the plant is without the damage. The codes CD1, CD2 and CD3 are the codes for 
plant damage states. Universal plant damage state can be defined as core damage in the case 
of nuclear power plants. 
The qualitative results of the event tree analysis include minimal cut sets for accident 
sequences. Accident sequence is a set of events, which result in a particular plant damage 
state. Example for the event tree on Fig. 2 is plant damage state 2, which ends with the CD1 
plant damage state and includes initiating event, success of safety system 1, success of safety 
 
system 2 and failure of safety system 3. If the fault trees for safety systems failures are linked 
to the event tree, the qualitative results of the event tree are similar as to results of the joined 
fault trees with the difference of presence of initiating event. 
The quantitative results include accident sequences frequencies. Each accident sequence 
frequency is simplified as a product of initiating event frequency and safety system failure 
or success probabilities. If the event tree is linked with the fault trees for safety systems the 
initiating event frequency is multiplied with the results of the respected fault trees. 
 
3.3 Fault Tree and Event Tree Integration 
For the analysis of a nuclear power plant, several event trees are developed and each is 
linked with many fault trees. The results are then combined together through all respective 
scenarios and through all the event trees developed for the plant level analysis. 
Fig. 3 shows the fault tree and event tree integration.  
Probabilistic safety assessment includes tenths of event trees and hundredths of fault trees 
linking together thousands of gates and thousands of basic events. 
If the plant damage state is core damage, the core damage frequency is the respective risk 
measure for the analysis at the plant level. Analyses up to the state of the reactor core are the 
subject of level 1 of the probabilistic safety assessment.  
If the containment and its safety systems are considered in addition, the damage state can be 
radioactive releases to the environment. Analyses up to the state of the radioactive releases 
are the subject of level 2 of the probabilistic safety assessment. The large early release 
frequency is the respective risk measure for level 2. 
Both risk measures: core damage frequency and large early release frequency are the 
indicators of the plant safety although the qualitative aspects of the results, which are the 
most important sets of component failures, which can lead to accident sequences, should not 
be forgotten. They have been the primary objective of the first probabilistic safety 
assessments. 
The described procedures help to confront with risk analyses, which objectives are written 
in answers to three questions. 
1. What can go wrong? Accident scenarios of the event trees give the answer. They can be at 
the level of the event tree or the can be at the level of linking with the fault trees, where each 
accident sequence is further represented by minimal cut sets.   
How likely is it? The probabilities of failures of safety systems and the frequencies of 
initiating events together give the quantitative results and rank more likely and less likely 
accident sequences. 
What are the consequences? Consequences are defined at the end states of the event trees 
and can be at the level of the state of the core for the level 1 of the probabilistic safety 
assessment, or they can be at the level of the state of the radioactive releases for the level 2 of 
the probabilistic safety assessment or they can be at the level 3 of the probabilistic safety 
assessment, which is oriented to the assessment to the dispersion of radioactive substances 
in the environment, where the weather conditions play the most important role. 
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the level of the event tree or the can be at the level of linking with the fault trees, where each 
accident sequence is further represented by minimal cut sets.   
How likely is it? The probabilities of failures of safety systems and the frequencies of 
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and can be at the level of the state of the core for the level 1 of the probabilistic safety 
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 Fig. 3. Fault tree and event tree integration 
 
The analyses show in general, that the risk of nuclear power plants is small compared to 
other risks to which we are exposed. 
Probabilistic safety assessments provide a technique for assessing the safety of a particular 
facility and also an information base that is applicable to a wide variety of issues and 
decisions. Probabilistic safety assessment is far wider than only the presented fault tree and 
event tree integration. The probabilistic safety assessment includes the following main 
topics. 
Information collection include collection of large amount of information including systems 
design descriptions with drawings, operating procedures, technical specifications, 
manufacturer requirements and recommendations for the testing and maintenance, other 
studies about the plant and standards about the equipment. 
Analysis of human reliability and analysis of plant procedures includes the behaviour of 
operators during testing and maintenance and during routine operations and the diagnosis 
and actions of the operator teams after the occurrence of undesired initiating events. 
Data-base development includes collection, classification and evaluation of generic 
reliability data when the specific data is not yet available and collection, classification and 
evaluation of plant specific data as a support for quantitative risk analyses. 
Accident sequence quantification and systems quantification includes application of 
powerful computer codes for probabilistic safety assessment. Consideration of truncation or 
cut off is an important issue. Namely, the models are so large that it is not possible 
analytically solve the models. Approximations are made and negligible contributions are 
neglected (Čepin, 2005). 
 
External event analysis includes consideration of earthquakes, fires, floods and other 
applicable external events for which it is necessary evaluate the plant response. 
Uncertainty analysis is important as many of probabilistic models include parameters, for 
which is difficult to get accurate data. Approximations are done and uncertain models are 
used, which propagate to the results. The risk-informed decision-making has to consider the 
uncertainties of the evaluations. 
Analysis of physical processes in materials exposed to high temperatures and pressures in 
normal and accident conditions is a difficult issue, which has to be performed. Many of 
those analyses are highly uncertain due to very demanding mathematical models of 
unknown processes. 
Analysis of radionuclide release and transport in the environment is largely connected with 
weather conditions, which may impact the spread of the radionuclide materials in the 
environment. 
Special section of the probabilistic safety assessment is its application for other modes than 
the full plant power operation, e.g. plant shutdown (Kiper, 2002; NUREG/CR-6144, 1995; 
NUREG-1449, 1992; IAEA-TECDOC-1144, 2000). Conduction of the analysis is focused to 
several time windows. One after another, each time window and each configuration is 
considered and in each time window the risks are assessed. The configuration with reactor 
head open for the refuelling is the most important configuration in terms of shutdown risk 
in nuclear power plants with pressurized water reactors. 
 
3.4 Risk Criteria 
The risk criterion is a term, which distinguishes between what is considered as an acceptable 
level of safety and what it is not (Čepin, 2007b). 
The national approaches about risk criteria differ notably from country to country, so no 
commonly accepted international agreement exists (NKS-44, 2001; GS-1.14, 2002; Berg et al., 
2003).  
Quantitative risk objectives in United States of America consider individual and societal 
risk: 
- The mean risk of an individual near a nuclear power plant (living within 1 mile radius) to 
receive an acutely lethal dose through a reactor accident is not to exceed 5E-7/year (this 
corresponds roughly to 0,1% of the risk from all fatal accidents). 
- The risk for the general population within ten-mile-radius around a nuclear power plant to 
die of cancer as a result of the reactor operation should not exceed 2E-6/year (this 
corresponds to about 0,1% of the total cancer risk conditional on industrial activities). 
In spite of the fact that no common criteria exist internationally, one can conclude that the 
production of electrical energy from nuclear power should not contribute notably to the 
overall risk is common to the national approaches. 
The ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle is mostly acceptable, which 
states that the risk should be as low as it is reasonably achievable. 
In addition, a common position exists that the future power plants should be better and 
safer than the current ones, which is the position of International Atomic Energy Agency.  
Namely, the existing and future plants are distinguished in sense that the criteria are stricter 
in case of future plants for an order of magnitude. 
The objective for core damage frequency for existing plants is 1E-4/reactor-year and for 
future plants it is 1E-5/ reactor-year.  
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applicable external events for which it is necessary evaluate the plant response. 
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which is difficult to get accurate data. Approximations are done and uncertain models are 
used, which propagate to the results. The risk-informed decision-making has to consider the 
uncertainties of the evaluations. 
Analysis of physical processes in materials exposed to high temperatures and pressures in 
normal and accident conditions is a difficult issue, which has to be performed. Many of 
those analyses are highly uncertain due to very demanding mathematical models of 
unknown processes. 
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weather conditions, which may impact the spread of the radionuclide materials in the 
environment. 
Special section of the probabilistic safety assessment is its application for other modes than 
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several time windows. One after another, each time window and each configuration is 
considered and in each time window the risks are assessed. The configuration with reactor 
head open for the refuelling is the most important configuration in terms of shutdown risk 
in nuclear power plants with pressurized water reactors. 
 
3.4 Risk Criteria 
The risk criterion is a term, which distinguishes between what is considered as an acceptable 
level of safety and what it is not (Čepin, 2007b). 
The national approaches about risk criteria differ notably from country to country, so no 
commonly accepted international agreement exists (NKS-44, 2001; GS-1.14, 2002; Berg et al., 
2003).  
Quantitative risk objectives in United States of America consider individual and societal 
risk: 
- The mean risk of an individual near a nuclear power plant (living within 1 mile radius) to 
receive an acutely lethal dose through a reactor accident is not to exceed 5E-7/year (this 
corresponds roughly to 0,1% of the risk from all fatal accidents). 
- The risk for the general population within ten-mile-radius around a nuclear power plant to 
die of cancer as a result of the reactor operation should not exceed 2E-6/year (this 
corresponds to about 0,1% of the total cancer risk conditional on industrial activities). 
In spite of the fact that no common criteria exist internationally, one can conclude that the 
production of electrical energy from nuclear power should not contribute notably to the 
overall risk is common to the national approaches. 
The ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle is mostly acceptable, which 
states that the risk should be as low as it is reasonably achievable. 
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www.intechopen.com
Nuclear Power134
 
The objective for large early release frequency for existing plants is 1E-5/ reactor-year and 
for future plants it is 1E-6/ reactor-year. 
 
3.5 Risk-Informed Decision-Making 
In addition to the risk criteria for the nuclear power plant operation, the risk criteria in some 
countries are developed in two aspects considering the acceptability of changes. 
- The first aspect includes permanent changes; e.g. assessment of acceptability of plant 
modifications. 
- The second aspect includes temporary changes; e.g. consideration about the on-line 
maintenance. 
Plant modification is a permanent change in the plant, which may be a physical change (e.g. 
an upgrade of a system, an addition of redundant equipment, a replacement of some 
components) or a non-physical change (e.g. improved plant operating procedure or 
improved testing and maintenance procedure, a change connected with certain 
requirement). An assessment of acceptability of plant modifications requires the risk criteria 
for permanent changes in the plant, because modification is a permanent change and it 
represents a potential for permanent change in risk. 
On-line maintenance is a wide process of planning, analysing, preparation and 
implementation of the testing and maintenance of the plant equipment (mostly equipment, 
which is in stand-by), when the plant is operating, instead of performing those activities in 
the outage period, when the plant is shut down for refuelling. Consideration about on-line 
maintenance requires the risk criteria for temporary changes in the plant, because each 
activity of the on-line maintenance represents a temporary change and it represents a 
potential for temporary change in risk. In addition, consideration about on-line maintenance 
may require the risk criteria for permanent changes in the plant, because the approval of the 
overall concept of the on-line maintenance represents a potential for permanent change in 
risk. 
The risk-informed decision-making is a term describing the process of assessing risks 
connected with technical decisions and considering of the risk results together with other 
means or with safety analyses to reach the most appropriate decisions. 
The main and the most general rule is that the activities, which results in decrease of risk, 
are appreciated and mostly approved. Further, the activities, for which a small increase of 
risk is evaluated, can be considered acceptable, if the risk increase is small and if there are 
benefits of the change, which overrule the increase of risk, or if there are no methods and 
tools to evaluate completely the proposed change in terms of positive and negative aspects 
in terms of risk. Namely, sometimes it is difficult to evaluate quantitatively all the positive 
and negative aspects of proposed change in such extent that risk models qualitatively and 
quantitatively include all the positive and negative aspects of the proposed change. 
Finally, if a large increase of risk is connected with proposed change, such change is not 
acceptable. 
The risk of testing and maintenance of standby safety equipment with consideration of 
single configuration change can be represented by the core damage frequency or by the 
large early release frequency. Fig. 4 shows the increased risk as a result of outage of standby 
equipment i where the core damage frequency is the selected risk measure.  
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The nominal risk is increased in an amount due to inoperable standby safety equipment at 
the time duration of testing and maintenance of equipment i.  The increased risk (Riski) 
should be lower than the acceptance criteria, e.g. Riskcriteria=1E-6 (PSA Applications Guide, 
1995; Čepin, 2007b), as it is in equation 15 below. 
 
iii dCDFRisk   (12) 
where: 
nii CDFCDFCDF  1  (13) 
 
CDFn - increase of core damage frequency due to outage of equipment i, 
CDFn - core damage frequency for the nominal conditions of the plant, 
CDFi1 - core damage frequency with equipment i unavailable due to testing or maintenance, 
di … time duration of testing or maintenance of equipment i. 
If testing and maintenance is performed more frequently than yearly, the frequency of tests 
is considered in addition. 
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fi - frequency of testing and maintenance activities, 
T - time interval considered (e.g. 1 year). 
 
criteriai RiskRisk   (15) 
 
Riskcriteria – limit of risk criteria. 
The criteria may be different for one temporary change and for a cumulative impact of more 
temporary changes over certain time interval (Čepin, 2007b). 
Examples of testing of standby safety equipment are diesel generators in a nuclear power 
plant. Diesel generators in a nuclear power plant are standby equipment, which should 
operate in the case if other sources of power system are lost. In such case, they provide 
power to the safety systems in order to cool the reactor, even if the reactor is in shutdown. 
Table 2 shows the results of the risk evaluation, if the diesel generator 1 would be the 
candidate for the on-line maintenance in a nuclear plant. 
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operate in the case if other sources of power system are lost. In such case, they provide 
power to the safety systems in order to cool the reactor, even if the reactor is in shutdown. 
Table 2 shows the results of the risk evaluation, if the diesel generator 1 would be the 
candidate for the on-line maintenance in a nuclear plant. 
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The results include the core damage frequency of specific plant, its sensitivity to a specific 
change and the calculated increase of risk considering the risk increase due to inoperable 
equipment and the time duration of this inoperability.  
The first column from the left identifies the status and the equipment, which may be 
subjected to the on-line-maintenance, which is diesel generator 1. The second column gives 
the core damage frequency for nominal conditions of the plant, which is the same for all on-
line-maintenance activities of the same plant. The third column gives the allowed outage 
time, which is determined in technical specifications of the plant for the respective 
equipment and it is the longest possible time duration of testing and maintenance without 
shutting the plant down. The fourth column gives the core damage frequency with diesel 
generator 1 unavailable due to testing or maintenance. The fifth column gives the difference 
between the fourth and the second column, which represents the increase of core damage 
frequency with diesel generator 1 unavailable due to testing or maintenance. The sixth 
column gives the risk of on-line-maintenance for diesel generator 1, which is unavailable 
due to testing or maintenance. The risk is obtained by multiplying the increased core 
damage frequency with its duration, which is considered as the largest possible time 
duration, i.e. as the complete allowed outage time. The real risk is normally lower because 
the testing or maintenance is performed quicker than the complete allowed outage time. The 
seventh column gives the identification of the analyzed plant. 
The risk results in table 2 show that on-line-maintenance of standby diesel generator 1 of 
plant NPP_S does not exceed the criteria (e.g. Riski=RiskDG1<1E-6) even if it is performed for 
the complete allowed outage time. 
 
Equipment status CDFn (/ry) AOTi (h) CDFi1 (/ry) CDFi (/ry) Riski NPP ID 
DG1 inoperable 3,48E-05 72 5,11E-05 1,63E-05 1,34E-07 NPP_S 
Table 2. Results of risk evaluation 
 
4. Analyses, Results and Applications 
Applications of probabilistic safety assessment differ at the utility and at the regulatory 
body. Regulatory applications of probabilistic safety assessment include monitoring and 
assessing the effectiveness of rules and requirements, training of the regulatory body staff, 
risk follow-up, risk-based safety indicators, analysis of operational events, assessment of 
deviations, response to emergency conditions, ranking of safety issues, ranking of 
importance of plant equipment, risk-informed inspection, safety guidance and prioritisation 
of regulatory research. Utility applications of probabilistic safety assessment include: 
- optimizations of technical specifications, including surveillance requirements optimization, 
changes and exemptions to technical specifications (Yang et al., 2000; Čepin & Martorell, 
2002), 
- support for modification of licensing basis and assessment of plant changes, 
- management of in-service inspection and testing, optimization of maintenance, which 
includes preventive and corrective maintenance (Martorell et al., 2000; Čepin, 2002), 
- configuration control and planning of maintenance at outages, prioritization of activities 
and scheduling of the activities (Harunuzzaman & Aldemir, 1996), 
- improving training for operators and operational support stuff (Čepin, 2007a; Čepin, 2008), 
- improving of plant procedures (Prošek & Čepin, 2008), 
 
- improving plant vulnerability and security questions (Čepin et al., 2006; Čepin, 2009). 
In addition, probabilistic safety assessment is used for the design of new plants and it 
represents a chapter of the final safety report. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Probabilistic safety assessment is a standardized tool for assessing and improving nuclear 
power plant safety. Its primary methods are the fault tree analysis and event tree analysis. 
The fault tree analysis is oriented to analyses of systems, while the event tree analysis is 
oriented to connections between the systems. 
Qualitative fault tree analysis identifies the combinations of component faults that may 
cause the system fault. Quantitative fault tree analysis includes calculation of the system 
unavailability, calculation of risk increase factor, which identifies components, for which it 
is worth to maintain them well in order that the risk is not increased, calculation of risk 
decrease factor, which identifies components, for which it is worth to increase the 
redundancy or to improve their reliability in order that the risk is decreased. 
The results of the event tree analysis include accident sequences and their frequencies. The 
core damage frequency and the large early release frequency are among the most common 
risk measures in probabilistic safety assessment of nuclear power plants. 
Quantitative risk objectives vary from country to country. The common principle says that 
the production of electrical energy from nuclear power should not contribute notably to the 
overall risk. The risk criteria are stricter in case of future plants compared to existing plants.  
The risk-informed decision-making evaluates risks connected with technical decisions and 
helps to reach the most appropriate decisions. The applications of the risk-informed 
decision-making include evaluations of temporary changes such as on-line maintenance and 
permanent changes such as procedural changes or plant modifications in a nuclear power 
plant. 
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